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The Networking of European Foreign Policy: 
From Cacophony to Choir? 
Annegret Bendiek 
The European Commission has created a new foreign affairs project team led by 
Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy. This institutional reform represents yet another attempt to over-
come the incoherence between the CFSP and the European Union’s external relations. 
The expectations of a more networked foreign policy will only be fulfillable if the EEAS 
takes over inter-departmental strategic planning and Germany plays a leading role in 
flexibilising the CFSP/CSDP. 
In early July 2014 the European Parliament 
chose Martin Schulz as its President, and 
a fortnight later confirmed Jean-Claude 
Juncker as President of the European Com-
mission on the basis of his “Political Guide-
lines” by the large majority of 422 votes. 
Soon thereafter former Polish prime minis-
ter Donald Tusk was appointed President of 
the European Council for December 2014 
to May 2017. Finally, in late October, Parlia-
ment and Council gave their approval to 
the new Commission, which began work 
on 1 November 2014. This changing of the 
guard at the European Union will set the 
course for its future foreign policy. Schulz, 
Juncker, Tusk and the new High Represen-
tative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Moghe-
rini, must now turn to the task getting the 
European Union to speak with “one voice” 
in its external representation. 
The Goal: Coherence 
That job will be anything but easy. Academ-
ics and politicians have been pointing out 
for years that European external policy 
suffers from incoherence of substance and 
lack of internal coordination. The member-
states often pursue diverging strategic 
interests and find themselves at odds over 
fundamental questions, such as the impor-
tance of the transatlantic partnership, the 
proper line on Russia or policy towards 
China. There are several reasons for this 
lack of congruity in foreign policy. Strategic 
dissonance between the member-states is 
one, largely stemming from their different 
foreign policy interests and traditions. An-
other is the institutional division of foreign 
policy between different Directorates-
General and their inadequate coordination. 
Trade communicates poorly with neigh-
bourhood affairs; migration policy is devel-
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oped without reference to development; 
and security is disconnected from the Euro-
pean Union’s digital agenda. The Treaty of 
Lisbon was supposed to equip the Union 
with its own legal personality in external 
affairs, but in fact the old distinction be-
tween the Community policies of EU ex-
ternal action and the inter-governmental 
CFSP/CSDP persists. So although the Com-
mission has assumed responsibility for 
external representation, where it is to 
promote the “general interests of the Euro-
pean Union”, this encompasses only areas 
outside of the CFSP and CSDP. The Commis-
sion has powers relating to trade policy, 
cooperation with and restrictive measures 
against third countries, humanitarian aid, 
international agreements and external 
relations – but not for external security or 
fundamental strategic questions. So it will 
not be easy for the new team to construc-
tively tackle within the EU apparatus. In-
stead it must be feared that the High Repre-
sentative and the President of the European 
Council will continue to jostle over exter-
nal representation. Moreover, the Treaty of 
Lisbon requires international treaties to be 
ratified by a European Parliament that has 
become an increasingly assertive foreign 
policy player. Stormy debates over the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Econom-
ic and Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA) 
reflect this new politicisation, alongside 
relevant differences of substance. 
Political Programme 
In view of these difficulties, the political 
programme Juncker outlined in mid-July 
for the next five years would appear richly 
conflict-laden. He names three priorities 
from the Political Guidelines: “a new boost 
for jobs, growth and investment”, “a con-
nected digital single market” and “a resili-
ent energy union with a forward-looking 
climate change policy”. None of these goals 
will be achievable without consideration of 
international circumstances and a coordi-
nated policy towards third countries. 
A “resilient energy union” and a “forward-
looking climate change policy” are just as 
obvious core foreign policy issues as “a 
reasonable and balanced free trade agree-
ment with the U.S.” In her address to the 
European Parliament in early October, the 
High Representative also presented an 
ambitious foreign policy agenda affecting 
various departments. She intends to reform 
the European Security Strategy, expand 
cooperation on security and defence, pro-
mote stability in the wider neighbourhood, 
deepen transatlantic cooperation, and ad-
vance strategic regionalism above all with 
South America, but also with Asia. Further, 
she intends in particular to expand human 
rights cooperation with multilateral organi-
sations (United Nations, NATO, Council of 
Europe, OSCE, but also Arab League, Union 
for the Mediterranean and African Union). 
Finally, she points to the UN’s post-2015 
development process, where the European 
Union is expected to decisively influence 
the agenda. Sparring over powers between 
the High Representative and the individual 
Commissioners and member-states is in-
evitable. A close working relationship be-
tween the vice-presidents will be crucial for 
Mogherini’s authority. 
A Foreign Affairs Project Team 
It will only be possible to realise the ambi-
tious programme laid out by Juncker and 
Mogherini if the structural deficits of Euro-
pean foreign policy can be overcome. The 
new Commission took account of this by 
creating a new structure with seven vice-
presidents including the High Representa-
tive. The prominent position of the vice-
presidents is reflected in the provision that 
no legislative proposal may be introduced 
to the College of Commissioners without 
their approval. Concretely, this means that 
the “normal” Commissioners are each 
attached to a vice-president. In the case of 
the High Representative this creates a for-
eign affairs project team whose remit com-
prises European neighbourhood policy and 
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accession talks, international cooperation 
and development issues, humanitarian 
aid and crisis management, as well as the 
sphere of international trade. The High 
Representative’s team also includes the 
Directorates-General for migration/home 
affairs, climate action/energy, and mobility 
and transport. Within the group of Com-
missioners she will possess powers extend-
ing beyond the CFSP. Juncker has entrusted 
Mogherini with leading and coordinating a 
team entitled “Europe in the World”, to 
report on geopolitical developments and 
ensure that the foreign policy aspects of the 
Commission’s work are tied more closely 
together. The intention to link the High 
Representative more firmly with the other 
Directorates-General is reflected in her 
moving into the Commission’s Berlaymont 
building and scheduling regular meetings 
with colleagues assigned to her. 
The idea of much stronger networking 
of internal and external policy agendas and 
departments also affects migration policy 
and energy and climate policy. Juncker has 
created a new Commissioner for Migration 
and Home Affairs to both take action 
against unregulated immigration and make 
Europe more attractive for highly qualified 
skilled workers. Commissioner Dimitris 
Avramopoulos shares responsibility for this 
portfolio with First Vice-President Frans 
Timmermans. Both will also coordinate 
regularly with the High Representative in 
order to implement the proposed close 
interconnection of internal and external 
policy. Combining energy policy and cli-
mate protection under a single Commission-
er, Miguel Arias Cañete, and his coordina-
tion with Mogherini also represents progress 
in Juncker’s efforts to promote environmen-
tal protection, preserve competitiveness and 
at the same time reduce Europe’s dependen-
cy on third countries. Here the High Repre-
sentative will have the job of lending inter-
departmental orientation to the Energy 
Union project team under Maroš Šefčovič. 
In order to lessen the burden on Mogherini, 
the respective Commissioners may fulfil 
representative duties in her place. 
Creating a foreign affairs project team is 
an important step towards an institutional 
strengthening of the role and powers of the 
High Representative. Juncker is seeking to 
respond to sharpening global competition 
and put the Union in a position to speak 
with a single voice, by strengthening hori-
zontal links between different areas and 
overcoming the outdated separation of 
internal and external policy. If Mogherini 
succeeds in putting Juncker’s ideas into 
practice, there is yet hope for a European 
foreign policy capable of transforming the 
cacophony of different spheres into a har-
monious chorus. That would mean Euro-
pean foreign policy being less modelled 
on classical diplomacy. Instead the High 
Representative should in the first place 
communicate internally, speaking with 
the relevant EU foreign policy actors (in-
cluding the national parliaments) in order 
to develop a joint European approach. 
Conditions for Successful 
Networking 
Organisational reforms will not be enough 
to solve the problems ensuing from dis-
agreements between the member-states 
over strategic questions. For a coherent, 
networked EU foreign policy at least three 
conditions would have to be fulfilled: 
Firstly, the High Representative requires 
an adequate and competently staffed appa-
ratus of her own. To that end the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) needs to re-
cruit more of its expertise from academia 
and civil society. In future it must take 
charge of foreign policy networking and 
function as the interface between depart-
ments of relevance to foreign policy. It 
should therefore also set the agenda in the 
sense of preparing comprehensive foreign 
policy strategies. Only in an outstandingly 
qualified EEAS with a competent European 
planning staff will the High Representative 
be able to operate effectively between Euro-
pean Council and Commission. The EEAS 
should consistently work to turn itself into 
a coordinator connecting up the different 
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departmental policies of the European 
Union and its member-states. Here, Moghe-
rini should concentrate on enhancing the 
visibility and initiative of the Service and 
more effectively coordinating its inter-
action with non-state foreign policy actors. 
A crisis response centre should be set up at 
the EEAS to unite the relevant parts of the 
Commission and the Service, and to develop 
rules for CSDP operations. Fundamentally, 
the EEAS should see itself as the driving 
force of digital diplomacy in Europe. 
Secondly, in areas that demand unanim-
ity it will be important to apply flexible 
integration processes more frequently, in 
other words intensified cooperation. How-
ever coherent a foreign policy may be at the 
administrative level, it will run into trouble 
without unanimity at the strategic. Juncker 
and Mogherini therefore argue for the pos-
sibilities of “permanent structured coopera-
tion” to be applied more broadly, especially 
in relation to defence procurement. First 
and foremost this means France and the 
United Kingdom, but Germany and Poland 
will also have to be involved, especially 
where policy towards Belarus, Moldova, 
Ukraine and Russia is concerned. Only if 
these four states can finally reach a com-
mon strategic positioning will Juncker and 
Mogherini’s plans stand a realistic chance. 
It should be made easier to turn an initia-
tive started by a group of member-states 
into a full European initiative with the help 
of the EAD. 
Thirdly, there are particular tasks that 
German policy towards Europe must ad-
dress. First of all, Berlin should support the 
Commission in bundling its powers and 
help the EEAS grow into a new role as the 
inter-departmental strategic planning 
agency for European foreign policy. A very 
much further-reaching challenge is that 
Germany will no longer be able to conceal 
its position as a civil and trade power. 
Given that European foreign policy relies 
on France, Germany, Poland and the United 
Kingdom all pulling together, Germany will 
not be able to avoid a share of responsibility 
for the flexible integration of European 
foreign policy and a rapid deployability of 
CSDP instruments. Finally it must be re-
membered that only a European foreign 
policy will be strong enough to assert Ger-
man interests vis-à-vis third parties. Thus 
the planned reform of the German Foreign 
Ministry should strengthen both German 
European policy coordination and the posi-
tion of the High Representative and the 
EEAS. 
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